Mothers and Others: Who Invests in Children's Health? by Anne Case & Christina Paxson
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
MOTHERS AND OTHERS:
WHO INVESTS IN CHILDREN’S HEALTH?
Anne Case
Christina Paxson
             
Working Paper 7691
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7691




We thank Angus Deaton, I-Fen Lin, Sara McLanahan and seminar participants for helpful conversations,
Zahid Hafeez for research assistance, and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation for financial
support. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the National Bureau
of Economic Research.  
© 2000 by Anne Case and Christina Paxson.  All rights reserved.  Short sections of text, not to exceed
two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice,
is given to the source. Mothers and Others: Who Invests in Children’s Health?
Anne Case and Christina Paxson
NBER Working Paper No. 7691
May 2000
JEL No. I1, D1
ABSTRACT
We estimate the impact of family structure on investments made in children’s health, using
data from the 1988 National Health Interview Survey Child Health Supplement. Controlling for
household size, income and characteristics, we find that children living with step mothers are
significantly less likely to have routine doctor and dentist visits, or to have a place for usual medical
care, or for sick care. If children living with step mothers have regular contact with their birth
mothers, however, their health care does not suffer relative to that reported for children who reside
with their birth mothers. In addition to health investments, we find a significant effect of step
mothers on health-related behaviors: children living with step mothers are significantly less likely
to wear seatbelts, and are significantly more likely to be living with a cigarette smoker. We cannot
reject that investments for children living with birth fathers and step mothers are the same as those
made by birth fathers living alone with their children. Who invests in children’s health?  It appears
these investments are made, largely, by a child’s mother, and that step mothers are not substitutes
for birth mothers in this domain.
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accase@princeton.edu cpaxson@princeton.edu1See Hetherington et al. 1998 for a review of this literature. In this paper, we will refer to
children as “birth” children of a parent, rather than the more commonly used expression,
“biological” children, to highlight the fact that a parent can develop a biological relationship
with a child that he or she has not given birth to, through contact with that child. See Blaffer
Hrdy 1999 (page 57).
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1. Introduction
Much has been written about outcomes for children in the U.S. who grow up with at least one of
their birth parents absent. These children, roughly half of all children in the United States, are
more likely to have academic problems and to drop out of school; they are also more likely to
exhibit a range of behavioral problems, including substance abuse, delinquency, and early sexual
activity; and they are more likely to live in poverty later in life.
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While much is known about the outcomes for children raised by a single parent, or by a
birth and step parent, less is known about the mechanisms that give way to these outcomes.
Scarring left by an earlier unhappy home life, and the stress of living in a new blended family, 
both appear to play a role (Cherlin and Furstenberg 1994), as does the economic insecurity that
accompanies marital disruption (Duncan and Brooks-Gunn 1996). Children who do not reside
with both birth parents move more frequently (McLanahan and Sandefur 1994), which adds an
additional layer of instability in the children’s lives.
Differences in outcomes may also be due to differences in the investments made in step
children relative to birth children. Parents may choose to invest less in step children because they
are not as attached emotionally to these children. Furstenberg (1987) cites results from a
nationally representative child survey which followed 2200 children for a 5 year period, and
which found that 15 percent of step parents failed to mention step children living in their
household when asked to identify all family members (compared to 1 percent with birth2
children). Similarly 31 percent of children did not mention a residential step parent when asked
the same question (Furstenberg, page 54). This lack of emotional attachment may be at least
partially the result of the step child’s behavior toward the step parent. The child may view the
step parent as a threat to his or her relationship with the birth parent, and may resent having a
new person in a position of authority (see Stevenson and Black, 1995, pages 53-56). Whether the
lack of emotional attachment is driven by the indifference of a step parent or the resentment of a
step child, the end result may be less investment on the part of the parent. Step parents who are
less attached to step children may hold lower expectations of reciprocal giving of time and
money with their step children, which may lead the parents to invest less.     
A complementary explanation for lower investments is provided by Daly and Wilson
(1987, 1998), who examine the possibility that parents invest to protect their own genetic
material and, for this reason, are more keen to invest in their birth children. They argue that there
is “a strong theoretical rationale for expecting that the evolved human psyche contains
safeguards against allowing a mere step-child, however appealing, easy access to that special
mental category occupied by genetic children, the appropriate objects for the most nearly selfless
love we know.” (Daly and Wilson, 1998, page 66.) 
There is little evidence on investments made in step children. There is a small literature
that examines the role played by step parents — usually step fathers —  in child maltreatment.
Daly and Wilson have a number of studies that carefully document the increased risk of physical
child abuse and child homicide among children being raised by a step parent. Step fathers are
more likely than biological fathers to be perpetrators of sexual abuse (National Research
Council, page 127). However, step fathers do not appear to be associated greater child neglect3
(usually defined as inadequate provision of food, clothing, housing, medical care, or education.)
Dubowitz, Black, Kerr, Starr and Harrington (1999) examine child neglect outcomes for a small
sample of African American children and find that, although greater father involvement is
associated with less neglect, there are no differences in neglect outcomes between children with
biological and non-biological father figures.
Other research looks directly at whether step parents invest in children’s education.
Beller and Chung (1992) present evidence that step children are significantly less likely to attend
college, perhaps because a step parent is less willing to underwrite the college education of a
step child. Case, Lin and McLanahan (2000b) use data from the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID) to compare educational outcomes of children from families with at least one
birth child of the mother and one step, adopted or foster child of the mother. They find that,
relative to the birth child of the mother, the other child is significantly less likely to obtain
schooling beyond a high school degree. This result is robust to adding time-varying household
characteristics and mother fixed effects. However, one cannot reject that the results on children’s
educational attainment reflect scarring or stress faced by step children, rather than the investment
strategy of a step parent. 
Case, Lin and McLanahan (1999, 2000a) use panel data from the PSID to examine one
input into children: food. They find that if a birth child of the mother figure in a household were
to be replaced by a step child, food expenditure would fall by roughly five percent. Consistent
with an attachment based on genetic connection, one cannot reject that the size of the fall in food
expenditure is identical, whether the child is a step, or foster or adopted child of the mother. The
results in Case, Lin and McLanahan are consistent with those discussed in Daly and Wilson4
(1998) in many respects. The results are strongest for the youngest children, and are much
diminished by the time a child reaches adolescence. In addition, the step parent effect is
independent of the effect that poverty has on children’s outcomes. (See Daly and Wilson, 1998,
page 30.)
Although the results on food spending are interesting, the connection between food
expenditure and child well-being is not well forged. It may be that reduced food expenditure has
a positive effect on children’s outcomes, if it reduces the odds of obesity, for example. It may be
that the reduced expenditure is on some product thought to be bad for children’s health. With the
limited data available in the PSID, it is not possible to pinpoint which food expenditure is lower. 
In this paper, we add to what is known about the relationship between household
structure and investments made in children, by examining parental investments in children’s
health. We find, controlling for household income and parental and household characteristics,
that children living with a step mother appear to be disadvantaged in health investments and
behaviors. Children living with birth fathers and step mothers are significantly less likely to have
routine doctors visits, or places for usual health care, or to wear seatbelts. In fact, we cannot
reject that investments for children living with birth fathers and step mothers are the same as
those made by birth fathers living as single parents with their children.
We identify two mechanisms that protect children raised by step mothers. If the child’s
birth mother has regular contact with the child (on the order of two to three times a month or
more), then the child is at no disadvantage with respect to doctors visits or places for usual
health care. In addition, when a step mother has birth children of her own living in the
household, then her step children appear to benefit. For example, children living with a step2For no apparent reason, forty households contain two sample children each.
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mother are less likely to have a place for regular medical care, unless the step mother has birth
children in the household as well. Our results are specific to step mothers; children living with
foster and adoptive mothers have health investments that are generally insignificantly different
from those reported for children living with their birth mothers.  Consistent with results in Case,
Lin and McLanahan (1999, 2000a), we find little evidence that the nature of the relationship of
the child to his or her father has any effect on the investments made in children.
In the next section we describe our data, and in Section 3 we present results. Section 4
concludes with a discussion of the role of mothers in the provision of children’s health.
2. Data
The data we use come from the 1988 Child Health Supplement to the National Health Interview
Survey (NHIS-CH). The NHIS is an annual nationally representative survey that collects
extensive information on chronic and acute heath conditions, doctor visits, and hospital stays, for
American adults and children. The survey also collects socioeconomic information for each
family that is interviewed. Although the socioeconomic information is less extensive than the
health information, measures of family income (in bracketed amounts), parental education and
parental work status are available. In 1988, 50,061 households containing 33,945 children
younger than 18 years old were surveyed. The 1988 child health supplement was then
administered to a single randomly-selected child from each family with one or more children,
yielding a sample of 17,110 sample children.
2 The person in the family most knowledgeable
about the child was asked to answer the survey,  which collected information on the child’s6
health outcomes, behavioral problems, and parental investments in the child’s health. Unlike the
basic NHIS, the child health supplement also collected detailed information on the relationships
between the sample child and other household members. Parent figures are identified as being
birth (“biological” in the survey), adoptive, step, foster, or other relatives or non-relatives of the
child. Other children in the household are identified as full, step or half siblings, or as unrelated
children. In cases in which the sample child does not live with one or both birth parents,
questions were asked about the length of time the child has lived apart from the birth parent, and
the current frequency of contact with the birth parent.
Most of our analysis uses a sample of children for whom both a “mother figure” and
“father figure” are reported being present in the household, and for whom the relationships
between the child and both parent figures are known. The sample is restricted to children who
are 0-16 years of age. 17-year-olds are excluded because they were allowed to answer the survey
questions themselves, and also because several of the parental investments we examine (for
example, seat belt use and smoking) may, by age 17, be under the control of the child. In several
cases, 17-year-olds in the survey were married or had a child themselves. We also remove a
small number of “rare” household structures: children living with birth mothers and foster
fathers (4 cases); step mothers and adoptive fathers (1 case); step mothers and step fathers (3
cases); and adoptive mothers and step fathers (7 cases). Results do not change when we keep
these cases in our sample. However, because these cases were rare, we wanted to ensure that our
results were not being driven by them. In addition, 475 cases were dropped because the child
health respondent was reported to have an age of zero or be less than 12 years old. The final
sample contains 10,541 children. In some of the results that follow we compare investments in7
children with two parents figures with those for children who have only one parent figure. In this
case, the sample described above is combined with a sample of 2,715 children who live with
either their birth mother (and have no father figure), or with their birth father (and have no
mother figure.)  
The definition of “step parent” requires some discussion. The NHIS-CH asked the
respondent to identify the child’s “mother figure” and “father figure,” making it clear that
mother or father figures could be people other than the birth parents of the child. Then, the
respondent was asked to specify the nature of the relationship between the sample child and each
of the parent figures (biological, foster, step, etc.) Of the 17,110 children sampled, 478 (or,
2.79%) of children had mother figures for whom the type of mother figure was coded as
“unknown” — although in many of these cases, the mother figure was herself the respondent!
Another 566, or 3.31%, of children had a father figure with type unknown. We suspect that these
parents of unknown type consist largely of “informal” step parents, who are living with but are
not married to one of the child’s birth parents. However, without better information on exactly
who these “type unknown” parents are, we chose a conservative strategy of coding children as
having a step parent only if an answer of “step parent” was given, and children with “type
unknown” parents were excluded from the analysis. Thus, this study does not address the role
that non-marital partners of birth parents play in children’s lives. 
Table 1 contains descriptive statistics, by family type, on the set of parental investments
and behaviors we analyze, as well as information on the socioeconomic characteristics of
families. The investments and behaviors we examine include: whether the child had a routine
doctor visit in the last year; whether the child visited a dentist in the last year; whether the child8
has a usual bedtime; whether the child has a usual place for routine medical care and a usual
place for sick care; whether the child wears a seatbelt most of the time; whether household
members smoke in the home; and whether the child is covered by either private health insurance
or Medicaid. The first three of these measures are used only for children over the age of 1. All
but 5% of the sample children age 1 or less had a doctor visit in the year before the interview,
and almost none had a dentist visit. The question on “usual bedtime” was not asked for children
under the age of 1; whether we choose a sample of children greater than age 1, or greater than or
equal to age 1 makes little difference to the results that follow. 
We chose the investments and parental behaviors listed above because they are inputs
into children’s health, rather than health outcomes. Outcomes, although interesting in their own
right, may be the driven by earlier events in a child’s life, that are in turn correlated with current
family structure. For example, a finding that children of step parents are more likely to have
accidental injuries could be due to less careful parenting by step parents. However, it could also
be that children whose parents have divorced and remarried develop behaviors that make them
more accident-prone. Similar arguments can be made for children’s behavioral outcomes or their
educational performance.
The descriptive statistics in the top panel of Table 1 indicate that there are substantial
differences in health investments across the different family types. Overall, pairs of adoptive
parents appear to do the best, and are even more likely to invest in their children than are pairs of
birth parents. Adoptive parents are more likely than birth parents to have taken the child to a
routine doctor visit (.65 versus .61) and a dentist visit (.73 versus .64) in the last year, and are
less likely to smoke at home (.24 versus .36). Although the sample of foster children is small,9
this group also appears to fare well. A comparison of step parent families with birth parent
families reveals differences in some, although not all, of the health investment measures.
Children in families with step fathers are less likely to have routine doctor’s visits, usual places
for medical care, to regularly wear seatbelts, and to have health insurance coverage. They are
more likely to be exposed to cigarette smoke at home. The same patterns appear for children in
families with step mothers, and for several of the measures, investments are even less likely in
step mother families than in step father families.
There are also large differences across family types in other household characteristics, 
such as income, education, and the age of the child. It is possible that these differences account
for the different patterns in investments noted above. For example, families with pairs of
adoptive parents have, on average, higher family incomes, smaller family sizes, and more
parental education than do other families. Considering that, in addition, adoptive parents have
been screened as “good parents” prior to adopting, it is hardly surprising that the levels of
investments among these families is high. Foster families, although with lower levels of income
and education, are also typically screened, trained, and monitored. 
The characteristics of step families differ in small but potentially important ways from
those of birth parent families. Income and education levels are slightly lower in step families,
especially in those with a step father. In addition, children in step families are on average older
than those who live with their birth parents. If health investments vary systematically with the
age of the child (so that, for example, older children have less frequent routine doctor’s visits),
then the differences in investment behavior shown in the top part of the table could simply
reflect differences in children’s ages. In the results that follow, it will be important to control for10
differences in characteristics of children and their that may influence health investments.
3. Results
Our analysis of the effect of family structure on health outcomes begins in Table 2, where we
regress the probability of investment in child health for children aged 0 to 16 years old on
variables identifying family structure and measures of household socioeconomic status. We
include indicator variables for all of the following: child’s age, household income (28
categories), household size (11 categories, one for each household size); and MSA status (4
categories). We also control for parents’ ages and educations, and indicators of parents’ work
status. Work status is included both to give us a richer picture of household finances, and to
control for parents’ other time commitments. We also include mother’s age at the child’s birth as
a measure of a child’s vulnerability, and indicators that the child is female and that the child is
white. We observe in these data that when the father figure is the child’s health respondent, the
child is less likely to be reported as suffering from any physical ailments. In part we believe this
reflects the fact that women are the primary health care givers and investors, and the fathers may
not know as much about child’s health or health investments. For this reason, we include a
control indicating the father figure is the child’s health respondent. (Results do not change when
we remove all children whose father figures were their health respondents.) In an attempt to
control for respondent effects more generally, we include controls for child health respondent’s
sex, age and education, and an indicator of his or her work status.
Our focus will be primarily on the indicators identifying family structure—that the child
is living with a step mother, an adoptive mother, a step father, an adoptive father, or foster11
parents. The omitted categories throughout will be ‘birth mother’ and ‘birth father,’ so that the
coefficients on family structure answer the question: holding constant all of the household
income and socioeconomic characteristics discussed above, relative to living with his or her birth
mother, how does living with (say) an adoptive mother affect the probability that the child has
had a routine doctor’s visit in the past year.
In each of our tables, column (a) presents results in which responses to questions on
investments in child health have been coded as follows. If the respondent answers affirmatively
to the question posed, then the response is coded as a “1.” Otherwise, the response is coded as a
“0.” In contrast, in column (b) for each health investment, an affirmative response is coded as a
“1,” a negative response is coded as a “0” and answers in which the respondent “doesn’t know”
or “refuses to say” is set as a missing value. For some health investments, that the respondent
does not know the answer to the question has information value. For example, if the respondent
does not know whether the child has been to the dentist in the past year, this may signal
something about the attention the child receives. We will find small but important differences in
the results when the “don’t know” answers are treated as a negative  response, relative to when
they are treated as missing.  Results in columns marked (b) are restricted to the sub-sample for
which there are no missing values for any of the dependent variables.
3.1 Investments in Child Health and Well Being
Results for routine doctors’ visits in the past year are presented in the first two columns
of Table 2. We find that children with adoptive mothers and those with foster parents are
significantly more likely to have been to the doctor than are children who reside with their birth12
mothers, and that for foster children this result is quite large. (This may reflect a legal duty that
foster parents must discharge.) Children with step mothers are significantly less likely to have
been reported as visiting the doctor—about 8 percent less likely—and much of this appears to be
due to the fact that the respondent did not know whether the child had seen a doctor for a routine
visit. (We examine below why this might be the case.)
For this health investment, as well as the others presented in Table 2, the education of the
mother figure in the household is a much larger and more significant determinant of health
investment than is father’s education. In all of these investments, the impact of an additional year
of mother’s education is five to ten times as large as that of additional year of education of the
father figure. Again, this may be because mothers are generally the health care investors in the
household.  
Results for dental visits are presented in columns 3 and 4. The most prominent effect is
for step mothers and, again, it appears that for children being raised by a step mother, the child
health respondent is significantly less likely to know whether the child has been to the dentist.
White children are significantly more likely to have been to the dentist, and girls are more likely
than boys. 
 Results in columns 5 and 6 present results on whether children have a place for usual
medical care. Evidence from Lutz (1990) suggests that such children are at risk for not being up
to date on their immunizations. Children living with step mothers are significantly less likely to
have a place for usual medical care. Similarly, children living with step mothers are significantly
less likely to have a usual place for sick care. Children living with step fathers are also
disadvantaged in having a place for usual or sick care, relative to those living with birth fathers,13
although the effects are only half as large as those found for step mothers. 
Results in Table 2, consistent with the cross-tabulations presented in Section 2, show that
children living with step mothers are disadvantaged in health investments, even after controlling
for parents’ age, education and household income. We find that these children are also at risk in
some important household health behaviors, results for which are presented in Table 3. Children
living with step mothers are significantly less likely to wear a seatbelt “most or all of the time.”
It is also more likely that someone in the child’s household smokes, when a child is living with a
step mother than when living with a birth mother. That the child is less likely to have a place for
routine medical care (results reported in Table 2) is not due to lack of health insurance: children
with step mothers are no less likely than those living with birth mothers to be reported as
covered by medical insurance. The children of step fathers, in contrast, are more likely to be
without health insurance coverage or for the respondent to not know if the child is covered. We
do not know if this means that step fathers are less willing to invest in health insurance for their
step children, or if step father’s job-related health insurance policies do not extend to step
children, effectively making health insurance for these children more expensive.  
The difference in mother’s and father’s spheres of influence may be reflected in the
relative effect of their education on these outcomes. Unlike what was observed in Table 2 on
health investments, father’s education is a more important determinant in children’s seatbelt
usage, in smoking in the household, and in health insurance coverage. Mother’s education
dominates for children having a regular bedtime.14
3.2 Contact with Birth Parents and Effects of Step and Half Siblings
This section examines how contact with birth parents and the presence of half and step siblings
mediates the relationship between step parents and health investments. There are several reasons
to think that contact with a birth parent affects health investments. First, the degree of emotional
attachment between a step child and step parent may be altered if a birth parent is in regular
contact with the child. The child development literature offers several conflicting hypotheses
about how emotional attachment will be affected by contact with a birth parent. For example,
Clingempeel and Segal (1986) discuss how regular contact with a non-custodial birth parent may
“reduce children’s fears that the step parent is a parent replacement and result in more positive
step parent-step child relationships,” but such contact at the same time may undermine the
cohesiveness of the step family. 
Second, the behavior of a step parent may be affected by the presence of an involved
birth parent. Non-custodial birth parents may monitor step parents’ behavior, and contact with a
birth parent could result in greater investments by the step parent. Finally, it is possible that the
non-custodial birth parent undertakes the health investments that we observe: the reason we find
that the respondent does not know whether the child has been to the dentist, or the reason the
child has no regular place for medical care, may be because the birth mother is responsible for
the children’s medical visits. In this case, apparent negligence on the part of step mothers may
simply reflect the fact that they do not have responsibility for these aspects of a child’s care. 
The possible effects of half or step siblings on health investments are similarly
ambiguous. Although there is little written on this topic, existing research indicates that the
presence of half or step siblings will adversely affect the relationship between a child and a step15
parent, and that step parents display preferential treatment toward their own children. For
example, Mekos, Herington, and Reiss (1996) study differences across siblings in the type of
parenting behavior they receive (and in a set of child behavioral outcomes), and conclude that
differential treatment between siblings is “magnified when siblings differ in relatedness to the
parent” (p. 2161). However, many of the health investments and behaviors we consider fall into
the category of household “public goods,” and in this case step children could benefit from the
presence of half or step siblings. Exposure to cigarette smoke is the clearest example of a
household public good. The decision to allow smoking in a home involves comparing the cost of
not smoking with the sum of benefits over all household members. The addition of a more-
preferred birth child may count more heavily in a parent’s decision than the addition of a less-
preferred step child, so that step children with more half or step siblings (holding the total
number of children fixed) may fare better. Several of the other health investments we consider
— for example whether a child has a place for routine medical care — will have similar
properties, if there are fixed costs associated with making these investments.
To explore these extensions, we augment the regressions run in Tables 2 and 3 with
several variables. We split the indicator for step mothers into two variables: (i) child lives with
step mother, and has “regular contact” (at least 2 or 3 visits per month) with the non-resident
birth mother, and (ii) child lives with step mother, but does not have regular contact with the
non-resident birth mother. We also break the indicator for step fathers according to whether they
report regular contact with birth fathers. We continue to include indicators for adoptive and
foster children, but do not report them in Tables 4 and 5, in order to concentrate on the step
families.16
We find large differences in the health investments reported for those step children who
see their non-resident birth mothers regularly and those who do not. Those children who have
regular contact with their non-resident birth mothers have health investments that are not
significantly different from children with resident birth mothers. Step children who do not have
regular contact with their birth mothers, in contrast, are significantly less likely than children
with resident birth mothers to have seen a doctor or dentist or have a place for regular or sick
care. Results for this group of step children are consistent between columns (a) and (b): that is,
the health respondent knows that the child has not seen the doctor or dentist; it isn’t simply a
matter of not knowing whether this is the case. Having regular contact with the birth mother
protects the children’s health investments.  
For children living with step fathers, we see a similar pattern. Those children who have
regular contact with their non-resident birth fathers are no more at risk of not having a place for
regular or sick care than are children with resident birth fathers. Those children without regular
contact with their birth fathers are three to five percent less likely to have a place for sick or
usual medical care. These effects are significant but, again, much smaller in magnitude than what
was observed for children living with step mothers, where the effects were on the order 15 to 20
percent less likely.
In Tables 4 and 5 we also include interaction terms for step parents and indicators of
whether the child has step- or half-siblings in the household. If a woman has a place to take her
own children for medical care, this may spillover for her step children. Indeed, we find (row 5 of
Table 4) that, for a child living with a step mother, the presence of step or half siblings is a
significant determinant of whether the child has a place for sick care. The presence of a half-3We have run the complete sets of interaction terms: step children with and with out
access to birth parent with and without step- or half-siblings in the household. The patterns,
allowing for the complete set of interactions, look like those we have presented here. 
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sibling or step-sibling increases the probability of having a place for sick care and usual medical
care by 12 to 14 percent. We cannot reject that the presence of step- or half-siblings entirely
offsets the effect of living with a step mother when it comes to having a place for sick care. Thus
the presence of step- and half-siblings is somewhat protective for children’s health investments.
Notice, however, that although the child has a place for medical care, the child is still
significantly less likely to have been to the dentist or the doctor in the past year, if the child is
living with a step mother and does not have regular contact with his or her birth mother. Having
a place for medical care may be a public good, in that once a place has been identified, all
children are eligible to use this facility. Actual medical visits, however, take time, and are
generally thought to be private goods. For these goods, the step children are still at risk. 
The effects of contact with a non-resident birth mother on health related behaviors are
presented in Table 5. Seat belt use is less likely  among children who have regular contact with
their birth mothers (a result we do not understand). Contact with a non-resident birth mother
does not change the smoking habits of a step mother and, not surprisingly, does not change the
probability that the child is living with a smoker. In the case of cigarette smoke, what is
protective for the child is the presence of step- or half-siblings. This effect is large and negative
for children living with a step mother (although not significant at usual significance levels).
Among children living with step fathers, it is those children who lack regular contact with their
birth fathers who are significantly less likely to be covered by medical insurance.
3
Overall, evidence in Tables 4 and 5 display a pattern in which the health investments18
made in children living with a step parent, particularly those living with a step mother, are
protected by their non-resident birth parents and, to a lesser extent, by the presence of the step
parent’s own birth children. Children who have neither contact with the birth mother nor step- or
half-siblings appear to be most vulnerable.
3.3 What do we Know About Step Mothers and Step Children? 
There are many possible reasons why children living with step mothers are at greater risk with
respect to health investments. Some of these explanations center on the nature of the women who
become step mothers, and others on the nature of children who become step children. 
One could develop a selection model in which women who become step mothers have
less aptitude for mothering. These women would make fewer investments in both their birth
children and their step children. A more sophisticated version of the step mother as ‘bad’ mother
story could be told by appealing to the greater difficulty blended families have in developing 
norms—like children going to the dentist regularly— when the children come from different
original families. The difficulties inherent in being a stepmother may make women be less good
mothers to both their step and birth children.
To learn more about the women who are step mothers, it would be interesting to follow
multiple children in the same households, to test whether the birth children of a woman and the
step children of that same woman received different health investments. Unfortunately in these
data that is not possible: the NHIS sampled only one child per household. However, we can look
at the outcomes of birth children who have step siblings in the household to see whether these
birth children are at risk. If step mothers are ‘bad’ mothers or if families with step and birth4This result is consistent with the findings of Case, Lin and McLanahan (2000b), who
find that controlling for mother’s fixed effect in PSID households that the birth children of the
household mother figure receive significantly more education than the step children of the
mother figure.
5We are grateful to Janet Currie for this suggestion.
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children have a harder time negotiating, then we would expect to observe that birth children who
live with step siblings have fewer health investments than birth children who do not live with
step siblings. The last row in Tables 4 and 5 present information on birth children who are living
with step siblings. These results show that birth children living with step siblings have health
investments that are insignificantly different from birth siblings without step siblings, making
stories based on step mothers being ‘bad’ mothers untenable.
4 
A second possible explanation for some of our results is that step mothers do not have the
legal right to take their step children to the doctor or dentist. Legal or other conflict with the non-
resident birth mother may make it difficult for a step mother to invest in a child.
5  Our finding
that regular visits with birth mothers are protective of step children casts doubt on this idea.
However, it is still possible that birth mothers who visit only irregularly with their children exert
control over what step mothers can do. To test whether restrictions placed on the step mother by
the non-resident birth mother are responsible for the reduced investment we observe, we divide
children living with step mothers into two groups: those whose birth mothers are deceased, and
those whose birth mothers are living. Presumably, if the birth mother is deceased she can exert
no control on the step mother’s behavior. Results for these groups are presented in Table 6. In
the top panel, we compare the results when the child’s birth mother is alive to the results when
the birth mother is deceased. In the bottom panel, we compare the results when the child’s birth20
mother is alive to those when the birth mother is deceased or it is unknown whether she is alive,
or it is recorded that the child “never sees” the birth mother.  In both panels, we find that the
birth mother’s permanent absence leads to fewer health investments in the child. In every case,
the health investments are reported to be lower for those whose birth mothers are dead, although
often the difference between the birth mother deceased and birth mother alive outcomes are
insignificantly different from one another. These results do not support the hypothesis that the
birth mother is prohibiting the step mother from taking a child to the doctor.
An alternative explanation for the lower health investments observed for children living
with step mothers is that these children are more difficult to negotiate with, and that the step
mothers cannot force them to go to the dentist, or to wear a seat belt. Children who have
weathered a divorce may have more behavioral problems than children who have not. In
addition, that a child lives with a step mother indicates the child’s birth father was granted
custody after a divorce (except in those cases in which the birth mother has died). Paternal
custody is relatively unusual, and it could signal that the child had a birth mother who was
unattached to the child or was an unusually poor parent, possibly creating a more severely
scarred child. Or, it could signal that the child is exceptionally difficult, and was for that reason
put in the father’s custody. Whatever the mechanism, a finding that the children of step mothers
have more behavioral problems may provide clues as to why these children receive fewer health
investments. 
We explore this explanation of our results by examining whether children with step
mothers display worse behavioral outcomes than children in other living arrangements. Table 7
presents results of regressions of indicators for whether a child “frequently” displays a given21
behavior, regressed on the set of socioeconomic characteristics and measures of family structure
used in the regressions reported above. The sample is restricted to children aged 6 or older, since
behavioral outcomes were not coded for younger children. We find marked differences between
children with either step mothers or step fathers and children who live with both birth parents.
Step children are more likely be reported to feel worthless, be unhappy, sad, or depressed, or to
be withdrawn. They are also more likely to be reported to display impulsive or restless behavior
(“can’t concentrate”, “acts without thinking”, and “one track mind”). With only cross-sectional
data, we cannot determine whether these behaviors stem from the events surrounding the divorce
of the birth parents (or death of a birth parent), or are the direct result of step parenting.
However, with the exception of a few behaviors (“cheats/tells lies,” and “withdrawn”), children
with step mothers do not have worse behaviors than do children with step fathers. 
In addition, the children of step fathers, but not step mothers, are more likely to display
the kinds of behaviors that might make them more difficult to negotiate with. For example,
children with step fathers are significantly more likely to be reported to argue too much, be
disobedient at home and school, misbehave, have trouble getting along with teachers, be sullen,
stubborn or irritable, and to have strong tempers. Lower health investments in children with step
mothers cannot be attributed to more belligerent behavior by these children.
The results in Tables 4 through 7 lead us to dismiss any simple explanation of health
investments being determined by women who are inadequate mothers—their own children
receive adequate health care—or by children who are more troubled than those who live with
birth mothers and step fathers.22
3.4 Single and Two Parent Families
Thus far we have focused on two-parent households in which the relationship between the child
and both parent figures was clear. We complete this section by adding back in information from
single parent households, to see how health investments in single and two parent households
compare. Table 9 presents results from regressions that control for the same set of SES and
household and respondent characteristics discussed above, and has the following controls for
household structure: child lives with two adoptive parents, two foster parents, a birth mother and
adoptive father, a birth mother and step father, a step mother and birth father, a birth mother
only, a birth father only, and adoptive mother only. We dropped the following rare cases:
adoptive fathers with no mother figure present (3 cases); step fathers with no mother figure
present (2 cases); step mothers with no father figure present (5 cases); adoptive mothers with
birth fathers (9 cases); birth mothers with foster fathers (4 cases); step mothers with step fathers
(3 cases);  foster mothers with no father figure present (8 cases);. There were no cases of foster
fathers with no mother figure present. In all of the regressions reported in Tables 6 and 7, the
omitted category is the “two-birth parent” household.
Children raised by two adoptive parents (row 1 of Tables 9 and 10) have health
investments and behaviors that are not significantly different from those observed in two-birth
parent households. Children raised by two foster parents (row 2) are significantly more likely to
have been to the doctor in the past year, and are significantly more likely to have a regular bed
time. They are also significantly more like to be living with a cigarette smoker. Those children
living with a birth mother and step father are also significantly more likely to be living with a
smoker.23
Children living with a step mother and birth father are less likely to have been to the
doctor, or to have a place for usual medical care or sick care, and are significantly more likely to
be living with a cigarette smoker. The same is true for children living with their birth father only.
There is no behavior examined here for which the outcome for children with birth fathers and
step mothers is significantly different from that for birth fathers living alone. (F-tests for this
hypothesis are provided in row 11 of these tables.)
4. The role of mothers in health investments 
The results presented in Section 3 suggest that health investments are made disproportionately
by a child’s mother, and that on this dimension a step mother is not an adequate substitute for a
birth mother. There are two important questions here. First, why do mothers invest more than
fathers in children’s health? Second, why do step mothers invest less than birth mothers?
Mothers’ primacy in children’s health investments may be primarily the result of the
magnification of small differences in parental responses. Blaffer Hrdy reports on a study
(Stallings et al. 1997) in which new parents listened in a laboratory to two recordings, one of a
one-day old baby crying because he or she was hungry. In the other, a baby was crying during
his circumcision. The parents’ reactions were monitored, and their stress levels measured
through their release of cortisol, testosterone and prolactin. The parents responded equally
quickly to the “jagged and alarming cries” of the child being circumcised. However, the sound of
the hungry baby’s cry was responded to more quickly by the woman. Although it is not possible
to know whether this response is learned or innate, it may well be the latter. Small differences in
responses may be “exaggerated by life experiences and then blown out of all proportion by24
cultural customs and norms.” [Blaffer Hrdy, p. 212] 
Sociobiologists also argue that men face trade-offs that differ in important ways from
those faced by women. Men must decide how much effort to expend caring for children who
may or may not be their children, and how much effort to expend mating with additional
females. Unlike maternity, paternity is (or was) difficult to prove. Because women bear most of
the costs of pregnancy, a mother’s best response may weight more heavily the survival of each
child, while a father’s best response may include siring additional children. Consonant with the
discussion by Becker (1981), this may lead to an equilibrium where children’s health
investments are made in the mother’s sphere of influence. 
Step mothers’ investments in step children’s health is consistent with Hamilton’s Rule. 
Hamilton (1964 a,b) hypothesizes that altruistic behavior between any two individuals will
depend upon the degree of genetic ‘relatedness’ between them. Blaffer Hrdy (1999) refers to
Hamilton’s rule as “a formally organized metaphor for how natural selection shaped the
economy of maternal emotions.”[p. 364]  Blaffer Hrdy, who at times discusses Hamilton’s rule
as if ‘relatedness’ were simply genetically based, and at times as if it were based on a broader
notion of emotional connectedness, writes: 
As in all cooperative breeders, human animals have an internalized emotional
calculus predisposing them to protect, care for, and allocate resources to individuals
they classify as kin, their genetic relatives, or those they think of as kin. Familiarity
from an early age would be the most common cue, affection and sympathy the
immediate conscious motivations. Whenever costs of helping are less than the
benefits to their “kin,” alloparents [non-birth parental helpers] help. [p.271]
Step mothers may invest less in step children because the “affection and sympathy” needed to
motivate them to act are not present. Apparently, “affection and sympathy” are available to6We recognize that once Blaffer Hrdy definition of ‘relatedness’ is adopted, it is no
longer useful for hypothesis testing: anyone who invests does so because their coefficient of
relatedness is large enough, given the costs and benefits of investment. 
7For example, Bahr et. al (1994) write that, for fifty years prior to 1969, “Utah law
specified that custody of minor children be given to the mother unless it was shown that she was
an immoral or otherwise incompetent person.” The presumption that the mother is the best
caretaker was loosened and then finally abandoned in 1977.
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foster and adoptive parents. Indeed these parents may have been selected for these qualities.
6
Should we be concerned about lower health investments among children with step
mothers? It is true that a relatively small fraction of children with divorced parents are “at risk”
of being raised by step mothers. Data from 19 states compiled by the National Center for Health
Statistics in 1990 indicate that in divorces involving children, mothers received sole custody
72% of the time, fathers were awarded sole custody 9% of the time, and joint physical custody
was awarded 16% of the time (US Department of Health and Human Services, 1995.) We have
little information on whether granting fathers sole custody has become more common over the
past several decades. There was a clear shift in state custody laws in the 1970's and 1980's, with
almost all states abandoning the “tender years” doctrine—which asserted that mothers are the
best caretakers of children except in unusual cases—in favor of a standard in which custody is
decided in the “best interests of the child.”
7 Despite these changes in custody laws, evidence
from scattered states indicates that divorced fathers are not more likely to receive custody at the
time of the divorce than in the past (Bahr et. al., 1994, Santilli and Roberts, 1990.)
Although divorced fathers may not be more likely to be awarded custody, the overall
increase in the prevalence of divorce means that there has been a dramatic increase in the
fraction of children who live with their fathers only. Figure 1 indicates that this fraction rose26
from little more than 1% in 1960, to over 4% in 1998. The fraction of children living with their
mothers only has increased as well, but at a somewhat slower rate: the ratio of children living
with mothers only to fathers only declined from 7.05 in 1960 to 5.29 in 1998. These figures do
not tell us the change in the fraction of children being raised by step mothers. However, a large
number of children living with fathers only are likely to gain step mothers when their fathers
remarry—placing them at a greater risk of receiving lower health investments than if they were
in the custody of their birth mothers.
Although our results indicate that children in step mother households receive fewer
investments in their health, they do not imply that mothers should always be granted custody of
children, or that the “tender years” doctrine should be re-established. There are many dimensions
to children’s well-being in addition to health. If custody decisions are actually made in the best
interests of children, then perhaps the reduced health investments in children in households with
step mothers are offset by benefits that we do not observe. We also know little about the long-
term effects of having lower health investments in the domains studied in this paper. These are
important areas for future research. However, our findings indicate that research on children’s
well-being should pay closer attention to the relationships between children and the parent-
figures in their households. It is common to compare differences in investments in and outcomes
of children in single-parent and two-parent families. However, our finding that children with step
mothers fare worse, and that children who live with a father alone fare no differently than
children with a father and step-mother, indicate that the focus on the number of parents in a
family, rather than the kind of parents in a family, is misplaced.
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Table 1. Sample Means of Investment Variables and Family Characteristics

















Observations 9,023 1,022 162 85 9 207 33
Observations with child age >1 year 7,454 1,006 161 84 9 187 31
Routine doctor visit in last year (age >1)
Dentist visit in last year (age >1)
Has usual bed time (age >1)
Has place for routine medical care
Has place for sick care
Wears a seat belt almost all the time
Household members smoke in the home




























































Number of household members
Respondent is the father
Age of mother
Years of education of mother
Mother works
Age of father















































































Note: Family income is constructed by setting income equal to the midpoint of the 26 possible income categories. Families with income of $50,000 or more
were assigned an income of $57,500. Some families have missing values for the income category. The number of observations used to compute average family
income was (in order of the columns): 8103, 909, 152, 76, 7, 185, and 27. Means are weighted using survey-provided weights.30
Table 2. Investments in Child Health and Well Being
Dependent Variables
[variable means in brackets]
Routine Doctor
Visit in Past Year
For child age>1 yr
Dentist Visit in
Past Year




Child has Place 
for Sick Care
[.625] [.635] [.650] [.665] [.910] [.925] [.934] [.946]
Explanatory Variables
[means in brackets]







































































































































































































Number of Obs 8932 8420 8932 8420 10541 9971 10541 997131
Notes on Table 2. 
Results reported are for linear probability models. Standard errors are provided in parentheses. 
For each outcome, the first column (a)  reports results for the full sample, with answers coded: behavior =1 if
respondent says this is true for the child, and =0 otherwise. That is, “don’t know” and “refused” and “no” are coded
as zeros.  The second column (b) reports results for which “don’t know” and “refused” are set equal to missing. The
results here are for the sub-sample for which none of the dependent variables in Table 2 and 3 were answered as
“don’t know” or “refused.” 
The full sample is restricted to children for whom both a “mother figure” and “father figure” are reported being
present in the household, and for whom the relationships between the child and both parent figures are known.
Sample is restricted to  children aged 0-16 years of age, with the following exceptions: the child sample for doctors
and dentists visits is restricted to children aged 2 and above. We also remove a small number of “rare” household
structures: children living with birth mothers and foster fathers (4 cases); step mothers and adoptive fathers (1 case);
step mothers and step fathers (3 cases); and adoptive mothers and step fathers (7 cases). Results do not change when
we keep these cases in our sample. However, because these cases were rare, we wanted to ensure that our results
were not being driven by them. 475 cases were dropped because the child health respondent was reported to be zero
or less than 12 years old.
All regressions include indicators for child’s age, for household income (28 categories, of which one is omitted), for
household size (11 categories, of which one is omitted), and for MSA status (MSA-Central city, MSA-non-Central
city, non-MSA, non-farm); child health respondent’s age, education and work status; parents’ ages and indicators of 
parents work status; and a constant term. Omitted categories for parental types are “birth mother” and “birth father.” 32
                                    Table 3. Behaviors Influencing Child Health and Well Being
Dependent Variables
[variable means in brackets]
Child wears a




Child has a regular
bedtime




[.743] [.753] [.391] [.397] [.840] [.855] [.860] [.873]
Explanatory Variables
[means in brackets]







































































































































































































Number of Obs 10541 9971 10451 9971 8932 8420 10541 9971
Notes on Table 3. 
See notes to Table 2 for information about the sample. 
Results reported are for linear probability models. Standard errors are provided in parentheses. 33















(a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b)
Step mother, child does not have regular

















Step mother, child has regular contact

















Step father, child does not have regular
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F-test: {Step mother with no regular
contact with birth mother} = {Step


















Number of Obs 8932 8420 8932 8420 10541 9971 10541 9971
Notes on Table 4. 
Results reported are for linear probability models. Standard errors are provided in parentheses. 
See notes to Table 1 for information on the sample.
“Regular” contact with a birth parent refers here to respondent reporting that child sees the birth parent at least two
or three times a month.
All regressions include indicators that child is adoptive child of the mother figure, dichotomized by whether the
child has regular contact with birth mother; indicators that child is adoptive child of the father figure, dichotomized
by whether the child has regular contact with birth father; an indicator that the child is a foster child of both the
mother and father figure in the household; indicators that child is adoptive child of mother figure or father figure or
foster child, interacted with whether the child has step or half siblings in the household; indicators for child’s age,
for household income (28 categories, of which one is omitted), for household size (11 categories, of which one is
omitted), and for MSA status (MSA-Central city, MSA-non-Central city, non-MSA, non-farm); child health
respondent’s age, education and work status; parents’ ages; indicators of parents work status; and a constant term.
Omitted categories for parental types are “birth mother” and “birth father.” 34
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Step mother, child does not have regular
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F-test: {Step mother with no regular
contact with birth mother} = {Step


















Number of Obs 10541 9971 10541 9971 8932 8420 10541 9971
Notes on Table 5. 
Results reported are for linear probability models. Standard errors are provided in parentheses. 
See notes to Table 2 for information on the sample.
“Regular” contact with a birth parent refers here to respondent reporting that child sees the birth parent at least two
or three times a month.
All regressions include indicators that child is adoptive child of the mother figure, dichotomized by whether the
child has regular contact with birth mother; indicators that child is adoptive child of the father figure, dichotomized
by whether the child has regular contact with birth father; an indicator that the child is a foster child of both the
mother and father figure in the household; indicators that child is adoptive child of mother figure or father figure or
foster child, interacted with whether the child has step or half siblings in the household; indicators for child’s age,
for household income (28 categories, of which one is omitted), for household size (11 categories, of which one is
omitted), and for MSA status (MSA-Central city, MSA-non-Central city, non-MSA, non-farm); child health
respondent’s age, education and work status; parents’ ages; indicators of parents work status; and a constant term.
Omitted categories for parental types are “birth mother” and “birth father.” 35
































Panel A: Birth Mother Deceased




























Panel B: Birth Mother Deceased, or Vital
Status Unknown, or Never Present














Child lives with step mother, birth mother is














Number of Obs 8932 8932 10541 10541 10541 10541
Notes on Table 6. 
Results reported are for linear probability models. Standard errors are provided in parentheses. 
See notes to Table 1 for information on the sample.
In Panel A,  birth mother is deceased =1 if biological mother’s vital status is listed as deceased, = 0 otherwise. 
   birth mother is alive = [1-deceased].
In Panel B,  definition of birth mother deceased (etc) =1 if child reported to never see birth mother, or birth mother
deceased, or it is unknown whether birth mother is deceased, or it is “ unknown, or answer refused, or no answer” to
the question of how often the child sees his birth mother. 
Birth mother is alive = [1-deceased(etc)].
All regressions include indicators that child is female, white, and born to a teenaged mother; indicators that the child
is the adoptive child of the mother figure; indicators that child is adoptive child of the father figure; an indicator that
the child is a foster child of both the mother and father figure in the household;  indicators for child’s age, for
household income (28 categories, of which one is omitted), for household size (11 categories, of which one is
omitted), and for MSA status (MSA-Central city, MSA-non-Central city, non-MSA, non-farm); child health
respondent’s age, education and work status; parents’ ages, educations and work status; and a constant term.
Omitted categories for parental types are “birth mother” and “birth father.” 36
Table 7. Behavioral Outcomes of Children Aged 6 or more 
Step mother Step father F-test: step-mother=step father
cheat/tells lies .041 (.013) .010 (.006) 5.62 (.02)
argues too much .015 (.029) .043 (.014) 0.91 (.34)
bullies, cruel or mean -.001 (.008) .003 (.004) 0.22 (.64)
disobedient at home -.012 (.012) .021 (.006) 7.31 (.01)
disobedient at school .003 (.008) .014 (.004) 1.77 (.18)
misbehaves .008 (.013) .016 (.006) 0.29 (.59)
trouble getting along with children .002 (.007) .005 (.003) 0.15 (.70)
trouble getting along with teachers -.001 (.008) .014 (.004) 3.78 (.05)
not liked by others .001 (.006) .001 (.003) 0.00 (.99)
stubborn, sullen or irritable .023 (.018) .049 (.009) 1.96 (.16)
has strong temper -.017 (.019) .028 (.009) 5.33 (.02)
can’t concentrate .086 (.022) .053 (.011) 2.04 (.15)
acts without thinking .056 (.017) .031 (.008) 2.10 (.15)
one track mind .056 (.014) .042 (.007) 1.09 (.30)
can’t sit still .004 (.021) .017 (.011) 0.33 (.56)
high strung .015 (.020) .033 (.010) 0.74 (.39)
fearful/anxious -.008 (.016) .010 (.008) 1.16 (.28)
easily confused .004 (.011) .021 (.005) 2.23 (.01)
complains about love .029 (.015) .031 (.007) 0.02 (.88)
feels worthless .030 (.010) .029 (.005) 0.01 (.92)
unhappy, sad or depressed .018 (.007) .017 (.004) 0.03 (.87)
withdrawn .045 (.007) .013 (.003) 18.10 (.00)
Notes on Table 7. Each row represents the results from one linear probability model. The dependent variables are coded as 1 if
the child frequently displays the behavior, else 0. The columns headed by “step-mother” and “step-father” contain the
coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) for these variables. The third column is an F-test statistic and associated p-value
(in parentheses) for the hypothesis that the effect of a step-mother equals the effect of a step-father. The sample is defined as in
Table 1, and is additionally restricted to those aged 6 or more. All regressions include indicators that child is female, white, and
born to a teenaged mother; indicators that the child is the adoptive child of the mother figure; indicators that child is adoptive
child of the father figure; an indicator that the child is a foster child of both the mother and father figure in the household; and
indicator of  whether the child has step- or half- siblings in the household; indicators for child’s age, for household income, for
household size, and for MSA status (MSA-Central city, MSA-non-Central city, non-MSA, non-farm); child health respondent’s
age, education and work status; parents’ ages, educations and work status; and a constant term. Omitted categories for parental
types are “birth mother” and “birth father.” 37
































































































































































Child has regular contact with non-
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F-test: Step-mother, Birth Father = 

















Number of Observations 11355 10644 11355 10644 13256 12469 13256 12469
Notes on Table 8. 
Results reported are for linear probability models. Standard errors are provided in parentheses. 
To be included in the sample, the relationship between the child and parent(s) must be known. We dropped the following rare
cases: foster fathers with no mother figure present (0 cases);  foster mothers with no father figure present (8 cases); adoptive
fathers with no mother figure (3 cases); step fathers with no mother figure present (2 cases); step mothers with no father figure
present (5 cases); adoptive mothers with birth fathers (9 cases); birth mothers with foster fathers (4 cases); step mothers with step
fathers (3 cases).  
For each outcome, the first column (a)  reports results for the full sample, with answers coded: behavior =1 if respondent says
this is true for the child, and =0 otherwise. That is, “don’t know” and “refused” and “no” are coded as zeros.  The second column
(b) reports results for which “don’t know” and “refused” are set equal to missing. The results here are for the sub-sample for
which none of the dependent variables in Table 8 and 9 were answered as “don’t know” or “refused.” 
“Regular” contact with a birth parent refers here to respondent reporting that child sees the birth parent at least two or three times
a month.38
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F-test: Step-mother, Birth Father =

















Number of Observations 13256 12469 13256 12469 11355 10644 13256 12469
Notes on Table 9. 
Results reported are for linear probability models. Standard errors are provided in parentheses. 
See notes to Table 8 for information on the sample.
“Regular” contact with a birth parent refers here to respondent reporting that child sees the birth parent at least two
or three times a month.39
Figure 1. Fraction of Children Less Than Age 18 Living with Father or Mother Only
year








Source: Marital Status and Living Arrangements, March 1998 and earlier reports. U.S. Bureau of the Census, 
Current Population Reports, Series P20-514. 